What explains the failure of U.S. army reconstruction in Afghanistan?

ABSTRACT

This author wrote his doctorate thesis on post-conflict army reconstruction, submitting it in 2011. Continued research on the subject in the intervening seven years indicates that his theoretical propositions can be refined and improved. This article examines refinements to the model, and then applies those refinements in detail to the Afghan case. In so doing, it shifts the focus from potentially altruistic state-building to a case that was driven by pure national-strategic interests. Issues surrounding the liberal peace ideology dominate recent army reconstruction in conflict-affected states. The liberal peace underpinning is of supreme importance, so much so that in many discussions, it is internalised and accepted virtually without thought. This paper will advance the body of knowledge by establishing, for the first time, a theoretical basis for the widespread failure of army reconstruction in Afghanistan. The empirical basis builds on extensive previous research by other scholars. The resulting model can also be applied to better explain outcomes in other similar cases.     

Making defense planning meaningful: the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense

Hungary, a former communist state, adapted a Western-style defense planning system during the 1990s and 2000s. Although on the surface the elements of this planning system were similar to the planning programming budgeting system (PPBS) developed by the US Department of Defense, strategic guidance for defense planning has not been properly developed until recently. Thus, albeit PPBS-based defense plans were developed in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense (Hungarian MoD) regularly, they lacked both an expression of clear priorities and strategic focus. This article delineates the evolution of strategic guidance in the Hungarian MoD concentrating on current developments, and introduces the newly elaborated analytical concepts and tools, which helped to create needed strategic guidance in Hungary.     

美国“国家实验室”的属性辨识

美国国家实验室是美国国家创新的核心力量。常规英文搜索引擎通常检索不到"美国‘国家实验室’清单",目前国内已有文献大都将"联邦资助的研究与发展中心"等同于"国家实验室"。本文通过对"联邦资助的研究与发展中心"的深入比对分析,对美国"国家实验室"的类型进行了定量辨识,认为只有该国能源部"国家实验室"系列、国防部主管的Lincoln Laboratory、Aerospace Federally Funded Research and Development Center、National Defense Research Institute和美国国家航天局主管的Jet Propulsion Laboratory等与国内对"国家实验室"的共识基本一致。     

‘Mowing the Grass’: Israel’sStrategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

‘Mowing the Grass’, Israel’s strategy in the twenty-first century against hostile non-state groups, reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along its borders. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges.     

Contents and Author Index,Volume 19, 2012

The U.S. Congress, charged with overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons, including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and post–Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.     

STRATEGY FOR A NEW NUCLEAR AGE

Current U.S. nuclear weapons strategy, force structure, and doctrine contribute to the threat of nuclear terrorism in several ways. First, the U.S. nuclear stockpile presents opportunities for nuclear terrorists to seize the materials they need. Second, U.S. nuclear forces remain a key justification for Russia's maintenance of similar nuclear forces that are less well protected. Third, America's continued embrace of nuclear weapons encourages and legitimizes other states to seek nuclear weapons that they will have difficulty securing from terrorists. The national security interests of the United States would be better served by a strategy to shrink the global footprint of nuclear weapons and provide the highest possible levels of security for the most minimal possible deterrent forces. Given the inability to secure nuclear weapons and materials perfectly or to eliminate terrorism in the foreseeable future, reducing the global inventory of nuclear weapons and materials is the most reliable way to reduce the chances of nuclear terrorism.     

The impact of the us strategic defence initiative on the space race

This paper models the space race between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War using time series econometric modelling. The analysis shows that, post the Vietnam‐war era, military considerations play a key role in explaining the behaviour of US space expenditure. In particular, the US Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the early 1980s is shown to result in a changing structure of the space race. This is expected to continue in the future with the current anti‐ballistic missile (ABM) programme and the withdrawal of the US from the ABM treaty of on space militarization.     

Measuring defense conversion in Russian industry

This paper develops and implements a methodology for quantifying defense conversion in Russian manufacturing in the early 1990s. A two‐sector, three‐good model is employed to analyze the flows of resources from military to non‐military uses and applied to firm‐level survey data under alternative definitions of military production and the MIC. An aggregation framework is constructed to estimate the total quantity and change in Russian military production, the latter decomposed into intrafirm and intersectoral resource reallocation and overall industrial decline. Although there is evidence of substantial decline in military production, the data show little reallocation to productive civilian uses, neither within the MIC nor to other manufacturing sectors.     

Defense Spending Promotes Aggregate Output in the United States--Evidence from Cointegration Analysis

This paper provides new evidence on the question of the effects of defense spending on aggregate output in the United States. Earlier studies of this basic issue relied on traditional econometric techniques and the neoclassical production function theory. In this paper, recently developed cointegration methodology and modeling that is inspired by new macroeconomic theory is employed. The results from earlier studies concerning the effects of defense spending are mixed. The findings presented in this paper reveal that there is a quantitatively important and positive relation between defense spending and aggregate output in the United States.     

Defense Expenditure and Income Inequality: Evidence on Co-integration and Causality for China

There are conflicting views as to the relationship between a nation’s defense expenditure (DE) and its population’s income inequality (INEQ). DE, always an important part of government budget, can easily crowd out transfer payments, necessary to improve INEQ; however, these payments may also create a demand that may raise the income levels of the lower income earners. Consequently, the relationship between DE and INEQ is an important question. This paper examines the relationship between DE and INEQ in China for the period of 1989–2012. Utilizing basic cointegration and causality tests, our objective is to add to the literature by providing evidence that China’s DE, in fact, do have an impact on INEQ.